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Submission to the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 
By 
TOM DUNNE 
School of Real Estate and Construction Economics Bolton St 
DUBLIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION  
Ireland, like many other countries with high rates of economic growth, continues  to urbanise 
rapidly. There has been considerable emphasis on planning for this through the National 
Development Plan, the National Spatial Strategy, development guidelines and other measures. 
Through these the state intends that a proper planning process will lead growth rather than leaving 
it to market forces to drive development in what are regarded as undesirable directions. The latter it 
is feared will lead to unsuitable social, economic or physical outcomes.  
Unintended results have flowed from the implementation, or flawed implementation of many of 
these policies and have given rise to the issues noted by the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution in their recent call for submissions on a variety of problems.  
All planning suffers from the deficiency that it is not possible to forecast accurately what will be the 
circumstances that will apply during the currency of a plan or what the outcome will be. 
Consequently all plans must be tentative and flexible to a greater or lesser extent depending on the 
accuracy of the information used in the formulation process and the dynamism of the environment 
in which the plan will operate. Overconfidence in the efficacy of planning and a lack of proper and 
efficient methods to provide for the necessary flexibility could be among the explanations for the 
perceived failures in planning. But also the legislative framework for the planning system could 
contain detailed flaws that mitigate against the plans prepared and operated under it.   
This paper discusses issues around these and is intended as a contribution to the deliberations of the 
committee. 
To do this it considers the nature of spatial planning and its role in providing for the physical 
development that accompanies economic growth. It then goes on to analyse briefly the property 
market and to examine some of the characteristics of landed property as an economic good. From 
that it looks at the interaction between high house prices and the high price of development land 
and considers approaches to dealing with problems flowing from those phenomena. Finally it 
proposes solutions which would be easy to implement and would require only a modest change to 
existing planning legislation.  
The argument underlying this paper is that the planning process is not sufficiently informed by an 
adequate understanding of urban and property economics. It also suggests that legislative 
instruments used to implement planning in Ireland and the use of many fiscal supports are flawed. It 
is these that give rise to high development land prices and the incapacity of local authorities to 
respond to and provide for the demand for infrastructure and services flowing from economic 
growth.  
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PLANNING AND SPATIAL ECONOMICS  
Problems of urbanisation are often discussed without a sufficient appreciation of the power of the 
economic forces that shape the built environment. Indeed it could be argued that inherent in the 
country’s approach to physical planning is an assumption that economic forces can largely be 
controlled and directed to achieve such ends as balanced regional growth or shaping the 
development of Dublin. But these economic forces are not understood to a sufficient degree. 
Intensifying suburban development, increasing one off housing in the countryside and the continued 
growth of Dublin prevail despite numerous attempts at restraint.  
Planning for urban land markets is surrounded by uncertainty due to a range of factors. Firstly the 
data available to planners about activity in the market is particularly poor. Secondly urban land 
markets are notoriously volatile and prone to periods of great activity with high prices and other 
periods when property development is very risky and not profitable. These periods can last for a 
number of years. Hence the delivery of planning objectives can be frustrated by economic conditions 
during the currency of the plan, especially if the plan has been devised on unrealistic economic 
assumptions.  
Thirdly, in a free market economy, nimble and opportunistic entrepreneurs will act, as they do in all 
markets, to seek profitable opportunities created by the planning process. Speculation can be seen 
as the cause of bad planning but it may just be a symptom of a bad plan or flawed legislation. 
Speculation is a characteristic of all free markets and planners need to recognise this reality. They 
also need to understand the motives of entrepreneurs and provide plans that recognise land and 
property speculation is an economic reality. The alternative approach of making the legislative and 
administrative framework hugely complex, to deal with its worst effects, will frustrate the delivery of 
the physical development needed for economic growth.  
Consequently planning requires a proper understanding of the economic and business forces 
shaping our towns and cities. Policy makers who may not have sufficient understanding of these 
forces can propose solutions, which will be less than satisfactory, and in some cases exacerbate the 
problem. Many of the issues the committee has asked for submissions on, fall in to this area.  
In the past, when devising spatial policy and addressing urban and housing problems, both 
economists and policy makers have not fully understood the economics of landed property and 
urban areas. As a result some approaches adopted to resolving difficulties arising from 
administrative instruments such as compulsory purchase orders and the fiscal treatment of 
development land and property, often made little sense if analysed using theories of urban and 
property economics.  
Moreover spatial planners at both national and local level, politicians (particularly many local 
councillors) and others involved in the planning process, are not sufficiently familiar with urban 
economic theory to have an inadequate appreciation of the full effect of these on urban economies.  
Spatial economic analysis emerged as a distinct field of academic inquiry during the twentieth 
century and can be split into two fields, urban economics and regional economics. Urban and 
regional economics are important parts of the discipline of spatial economics. There is now growing 
interest in these fields in Ireland in academic and other circles but many existing planners and other 
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policy makers were educated when there was limited knowledge about these fields in Ireland. 
Internationally over the last decade there has been an increase in interest in spatial economics with 
the issues involved being brought to wider audiences. 
An extensive literature is now available to assist with the analysis of problems of urban 
development, housing and property economics. This provides insights that may not be familiar to 
many who are faced with resolving the problems of rapid urbanisation. Indeed many economists 
whose principal focus and interest has been on other aspects of economics, may not be familiar with 
the particular methods of analysing urban and property problems identified in the literature on 
urban and property economics. The familiar tenets of economics have to be adjusted to deal with 
situations where markets work in a substantially different way than might be expected.  
From the literature we learn that there is increasing interest in spatial economics and this parallels 
the need to better find solutions to the effects of rapid economic growth on our towns, cities and 
countryside. Some of the insights found in the literature on urban economics will be of assistance to 
the committee in considering the issues set out in the notice seeking written submissions. The 
following draws on urban and property economic theory and should be of help to the committee 
when considering the list of issues before it. 
 THE PROPERTY MARKET AND LANDED PROPERTY AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD  
The landed property market is not an efficient market in economic terms and has particular 
characteristics that make it difficult to analyse using traditional economic criteria. This leads to 
problems implementing development plans, to high development land values and with access to 
housing and shelter. 
 
It is crucial to appreciate that property markets are not easily understood and indeed work in ways 
that are economically idiosyncratic. There are a number of reasons for this. First landed property can 
be held as an investment and as a consumer good. Second each property is unique. Third, 
transaction costs are very high and fourth, the property market is not merely a market for land and 
buildings it is best understood and analysed as a market in legal rights. The consequences of each of 
these characteristics are worth exploring in the interests of understanding the issues before the 
committee. 
1  Property can be both an investment and a consumer good  
Landed property can be bought both for consumption and investment purposes often necessitating 
finance to purchase as prices are high. Landed property is one of the three main investment media. 
Consequently capital values will be determined as much by reference to conditions in other 
investment markets as by demand for the use of accommodation. Hence there is a significant 
interaction with investment and finance markets. Of crucial importance also is the availability of 
finance on favourable terms.  
Therefore the property market is best analysed as two markets with different influences on each. 
First there is a consumer market where demand and supply interact to ration space among 
competing users and determines rent levels. Second there is an investment market where the most 
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significant influence may be sentiment in the equity and bond markets as well as the rate of interest 
on borrowings. In general it may be said that the investment market determines the capital values of 
existing property assets while the consumer market determines rental values. This duality has 
profound implications for policy makers looking at problems in urban areas.  
Solutions to urban problems should have regard to the effect of investment capital flowing to the 
property sector compared with other assets in the investment market. It is entirely possible to 
create the conditions where too much investment money chases too little investment opportunity in 
the property market. It is easy to provoke a speculative bubble by unsuitable intervention with the 
benign intention to help people find a house, an office or a factory.  
The tax treatment of property is hugely influential in determining the profile of investment in 
property markets. In particular the lack of taxes on residential property encourages people to store 
their investment wealth in houses. In Ireland the lack of local taxes on residential property, a unique 
characteristic of our tax code, keeps residential property prices here higher than they would be if 
residential property was taxed as it is in other countries.  
In short, the urban land market is prone to speculative bubbles, which can be hugely influenced by 
government policy. The reverse of this is also true. It is just as easy induce damaging slumps. Much 
of government policy in the past has acted in a pro-cyclical way and amplified the natural boom/bust 
cycle of the market.  
2  Each property is unique  
Partly because title issues are complex but also because of the heterogeneous nature of land and 
buildings, each property is unique. Price comparisons are much more difficult than for other goods 
bought and sold making valuation difficult. As a consequence the property market is far from 
transparent, a normal requisite for an efficient market.  
Also, this characteristic makes it difficult to apply generic administrative approaches to solving urban 
problems. Solutions which involve applying a convenient administrative formula to individual 
properties will probably fail because every property affected can become an exceptional case due to 
particular unique features.  
Government policy should aim to increase transparency in the property market by insisting on a 
simple system for land and title registration and making transaction prices public, as is the case in 
many other jurisdictions. Measures such as this would assist the efficiency of compulsory purchase 
procedures. They would also assist the process of analysing urban areas by giving the data that is 
needed to provide the information needed for good public policy.  
3  Transaction difficulties and costs  
Transaction costs for exchanging landed property interests are high. High levels of stamp duty 
compared to those charged for transferring other property assets add to this. Also, as the public has 
an imperfect understanding of what is actually bought and sold in the property market, legal and 
other professional advice is essential when property is being acquired.  
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Moreover, because the law surrounding landed property has roots deep in history and is surrounded 
by concepts that are archaic if not arcane, legal and other issues are complex and demand legal 
advice to sort out. This costs money. These factors impede the operation of landed property 
markets. 
In order to help urban property markets work more efficiently, government policy should have an 
objective of reducing the transaction costs associated with the exchange of landed property. 
Measures should include reducing stamp duties and codifying and simplifying the law surrounding 
legal interests in landed property. Policy in this area should include a statutory legal requirement for 
the legal profession to use plain English as much as possible. Also all documentation surrounding 
compulsory purchases of land and the planning system should be written in plain English.  
4  The property market is a market for property rights  
The constitutional protection for landed property can be considered in the light of an understanding 
of what is traded in the property market and has economic value. The property market rather than 
being a market for land and buildings is in fact a market in the rights to land and buildings. This is a 
very important characteristic to understand when considering the question of windfall profits from 
development land rezoning.  
There can be no such thing as absolute ownership of land and buildings. The state provides a system 
of categorising the types of ownership of landed property by law and a structure defining the rights 
to property interests.  
Also, it is axiomatic that ownership of property rights is constrained by the rights of other property 
owners. Moreover, other people may have property rights affecting any piece of landed property; 
e.g. rights of way or of support to adjoining buildings. In short, ownership of property entails 
responsibility to the community generally and other property owners.  
The largest collection, or bundle, of rights to land and buildings that a person can own is a freehold 
interest and these rights can be unbundled and disposed of separately. The state often has to alter 
or limit the rights comprising property interests by legislation in the interests of the common good 
or to regulate social and economic activities. Put another way the state can by law circumscribe or 
remove particular parts of the bundle of rights that comprise particular landed property interests 
and has done so in the past. Examples of this include the granting of security of tenure to tenants, 
control of the airspace over property by the air navigation acts or control of use and development 
under the planning acts.  
What is traded in a property market is therefore rights to use land and buildings coupled with 
responsibilities to the state and others. These are not immutable and are subject to law and 
obligations to others. Development rights, which are regulated through the planning process, are 
just one of the rights involved. Since the introduction of the 1963 Planning Act these are no longer 
inherent in property interests. Indeed the planning system is constructed on the principle that the 
state has the right and the need to alter the bundle of rights that comprise legal property interests.  
All property owners benefit from the planning system in that at the very least it protects individual 
properties from inappropriate development on neighbouring property. More widely, complex 
modern urban environments require a formal statutory planning system to work effectively and 
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secure the interests of all property owners and the integrity of the property they hold. To have such 
a system it is necessary to give the state or a local authority control over development. This requires 
the removal of the right to develop without permission from the bundle of legal rights which a 
person holds to a piece of property.   
However, development rights have economic value and the consequences of having removed these 
rights is that property values are affected. The grant of permission to develop, therefore, confers an 
economic value to a property owner. Where a property is developed and permission is being 
granted for further development, such development rights already exist. 
Through planning development, rights are granted to some landed property owners but not to 
others and decisions are made on the basis of development plans adopted democratically by 
planning authorities. These plans are devised and implemented in the interests of the common 
good. It would seem logical that the community who, through a planning authority, made the 
development plan and provided the infrastructure and services required for development should get 
the value of the development rights thereby created. It does not seem to be logical to argue that the 
Constitution would require that a right with economic value created by one body should be 
transferred as a gift to another who does nothing to create this value. 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LANDED PROPERTY 
Where knowledge of market conditions is defective price signals work less efficiently and 
adjustments to supply and demand are slow. This is the case in the property market. Relatively high 
transaction costs, incurred either in obtaining market knowledge or in the administrative procedures 
involved, restrict the extent to which market signals can motivate a response to increased demand.  
Eventually the market will respond to signals indicating increased demand and additional buildings 
will be provided but this will take time, perhaps years. In the meantime limitations on the market, 
through inadequate or poor planning or other restrictions make it easy for imperfect competition to 
exist in the short run. In contrast, for people seeking accommodation the near future will be a crucial 
factor in making decisions about accommodation. They will have to bid against competitors for 
accommodation available on the market. Hence the effect of restrictions is to drive up prices in the 
short term.  
The consequences of the above and other characteristics of landed property are that the market will 
respond slowly to increases in demand for accommodation in the economy. Thus, it is in the natural 
order of the market that periodic shortages occur and these will be associated with high prices. The 
corollary is also true. When demand falls off the supply of property available in the economy will 
remain and prices will contract. Consequently the market is volatile and prone to booms and busts 
when prices overshoot both on the way up and on the way down.  
This points to the need for the government to be careful about policies that affect landed property 
particularly in the area of taxation. Pro cyclical taxation and grant aid policies will amplify booms and 
busts in the property market. The same can be said of the lending policies of financial institutions.  
All in all these characteristics make property markets difficult to regulate and manage from a policy 
perspective. Understanding them will help to analyse problems associated with high house prices 
and the price of development land.  
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One important consequence of the economic characteristic of landed property is that the increase in 
value created by granting permission to develop agricultural land is not inherent in the land. 
Development rights, which are denied to some property owners, are concentrated and increased by 
the local authority through the planning system and infrastructure provision and transferred to land 
zoned for development. The economic value that flows from denying development rights to others 
and from the provision of infrastructure should not be given by way of gift to the owners of zoned 
development land. Instead the value of development rights should be kept by the planning 
authority. The question at issue is just how should this be done and this is discussed later in this 
paper.  
HOUSE PRICES AND DEVELOPMENT LAND  
As we have seen, land by itself has little or no intrinsic value above its agricultural value. Clearly if 
you cannot use land it will have no economic value. The value of land suitable for development is 
directly related to the value of the buildings that may be erected on it. The value of those buildings 
will be determined by supply and demand.  
The value of landed property is not determined in the same way in the short term as the value of 
other commodities but is influenced to a substantial degree by the stock of existing buildings which 
have been constructed in a given location over past years. 
Increased economic activity and population growth will give rise to increased demand for 
accommodation. At first this demand will be met by occupying vacant accommodation from the 
existing stock. Those requiring accommodation will bid against each other for the available supply 
and prices will go up. At first this will encourage the more efficient use of existing buildings. It will 
also act as a signal to developers to provide more accommodation. But in any given period the new 
addition to the existing stock will be only a very small proportion of that stock. Therefore the market 
is dominated by the existing stock of buildings. Prices will be set primarily by demand for the existing 
stock and not by the flow of new buildings coming onto the market in any given period.  
The decision to develop or not takes as a given the price that can be achieved for the finished 
product of buildings available for occupation or use. Thus, for example, in the housing market 
builders are price takers and will sell their product at a price determined by the market and not by 
the value of land and the cost of construction. 
The inputs needed to provide buildings comprise the site or development land, to which is added 
construction material, labour and professional expertise, finance and the enterprise of the 
developer. All but the first will be in relatively unlimited supply compared to the supply of land. 
Consequently most of the increase in the value of property resources will descend to the site or 
development land. In this way the value of development land and sites as a factor of production is 
what is called a derived demand. Put another way the value of development land is the residual 
after all other costs involved in the construction process have been taken into account. 
When analysing problems in housing markets or in other property markets, urban economic theory 
points to two important principles that should be understood by those framing urban and regional 
policies. First, the price of landed property, including housing, is not determined by the cost of 
production. Second the value of development land is the result of high property prices not the 
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cause. These are important insights from urban economic theory, which allow a better 
understanding of the problems of urban development. 
The perspective of developers  
On first consideration these principles might appear to contradict common experience and not 
appear in accordance with a general understanding of how the market for land and buildings works. 
This is understandable.  
From the perspective of a particular developer or house builder it can appear that high land or site 
costs drive up the price at which they will offer their product to the market. Indeed, once 
development land or a site has been acquired it becomes a fixed cost to developers and builders. If 
there are complaints about the high price of property they will argue that the high cost of land 
forces them to sell at high prices. If prices stumble but demand remains, developers and builders will 
argue that it is the high price of land that is causing the affordability problem. They will suggest that 
for developers to be able to supply houses and other buildings profitably, government must 
subsidise developers or purchasers by tax breaks or grants or some combination of both.  
This may appear to be the case from the particular perspective of a developer. But urban economic 
theory demonstrates it is wrong to conclude that particular examples based on the experience of the 
individual builder or developer will point to a general truth. In simple terms, in the case of 
development land it is not correct to argue from the particular to the general. The general case is 
that high house prices cause high land prices and not the reverse. This is so even if there are many 
examples of individual developers who all share the same experience. 
It follows that while it can be prudent at times to provide tax or other subsidies for specific locations 
or for periods of recession, in times of economic growth they will usually have the effect of 
increasing the value of development land and sites and drive the prices of houses and building land 
higher in boom times. 
It may be concluded from this discussion that tax and other financial inducements intended to 
subsidise developers or to assist purchasers with the acquisition of property, including houses, find 
their way into higher development land values. This is even more the case when there is excess 
demand for the available stock of accommodation and prices are high. Attempts to deal with say 
high house prices, by providing subsidies ultimately have increased the value of development land. 
Hence, high development land values are an unintended result of government action in housing and 
other markets. Many government interventions in the market provide a good example of this theory 
in action.  
THE INTRODUCTION OF PLANNING TO IRELAND  
High development land values are a common characteristic of countries experiencing rapid 
economic growth. The reverse is also true. Economic recession or stagnation results in relatively low 
values for development land. Indeed they may not be significantly higher than underlying 
agricultural values. In the absence of land zoning confining property development to a restricted 
part of the lands surrounding an urban area, development land values would eventually decline to 
agricultural land values the further out from the centre of urbanisation one moved.  
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In the conditions that existed in Ireland in the late 1950s the economy was stagnant and land values 
on the periphery of urban areas would not have been particularly high. The main concern of a 
developer contemplating a housing development would have been the ability to connect to sewers 
and a water supply. There was no need to seek approval for the development. It should also be 
noted that at that time capital was scarce and difficult to access by way of a mortgage, and rates 
were payable on residential property. These factors and others would have kept ambient house 
prices down and hence development land values were not high.  
A person wishing to provide themselves with a house or other property would have had the choice 
of buying, buying a property built by a developer or buying a site at a price not significantly above 
agricultural land values and building themselves. During the period of economic prosperity in the 
early 1960s land values would have increased but in the absence of zoning, which came with the 
development plans published in the late 1960s, development land values would not have been 
dramatic. This was the background against which the Planning act of 1963 was devised and passed.  
In the circumstances that applied in Ireland in the late fifties and early sixties it is perhaps not 
surprising that the consequences of introducing a planning system with development plans and 
zoning were not given sufficient attention when enacting the ’63 Planning Act. The consequences for 
the value of development land of introducing the planning system, and particularly development 
plans which allowed land zoning, were not properly addressed in the 1963 Act.  
It says something that now we can hardly imagine a situation where such a process did not exist. But 
it is worth recalling the fact that what the ’63 Planning Act did was to remove from property owners 
the right to develop their property and provide a procedure where if they wanted to do so they 
needed the permission of the planning authority.  
In a sense this was a modern version of surrender and re-grant. On introduction the ’63 Act removed 
development rights from all property owners. It also instituted a process whereby the right to 
develop was granted by a planning authority following an application for permission to develop. All 
landowners whose land was suitable for development lost some value in 1964. However, as we see 
from the earlier part of this discussion, because of the economic conditions at the time this would 
not have been as great as might be thought if one considered the levels of development land values 
that now prevail. In any event doing this was necessary to bring into operation the development 
plans devised under the Act.  
The planning process confined development to those lands the planning authority thought it 
appropriate to develop. By doing so they automatically restricted the amount of development land 
available. The demand was concentrated on land which had been designated in the development 
plan as being suitable for development. This has the effect of increasing the value of the zoned land 
and reducing the value of land not zoned to agricultural land values, plus perhaps some element of 
value attributable to the hope that it would be zoned in the future.  
ZONING AND DEVELOPMENT LAND PRICES 
If a planning authority does not zone an adequate amount of land, the value of the zoned land 
would be increased by an even greater amount than might be expected. Just what is an adequate 
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amount of zoned land is, of course, a matter of judgement and judgements about this are hard to 
make and are influenced by political and financial considerations. 
In any event it should not be simply based on an estimate of the amount of land required to build 
new accommodation to house anticipated future population growth. This implies control over the 
rate at which development land comes to the market during the timeframe of the plan. The Planning 
Act confers no such power and leaves the rate at which zoned land comes to the market up to the 
individuals who own it.  
In fact a marginal shortage, resulting perhaps from the personal decisions of individual landowners 
not to bring zoned land to the market, can have a disproportionate effect and drive up prices. Such a 
deficiency of the supply of zoned land on the market, even if it is just marginal, will result in a big 
increase in value of the land that does come to the market. Indeed, values may have to increase very 
substantially to tempt a reluctant landowner to sell despite personal reasons for not doing so.  
The solution would appear easy. Simply zone and service much more land than that required to 
meet forecasted development needs. Local authorities are, however, understandably reluctant to do 
this because the resources available to service land are scarce. Plainly it would be wasteful to 
provide services to land that may not be developed for a generation.  
It makes sense only to service land that the plan sets out for development within the timeframe of 
the development plan. The implied expectation is that land will come to the market because of the 
uplift in values due to zoning. It is questionable whether windfall profits act as an incentive in this 
way. If they do not it means that development plans are based on what is essentially an act of faith 
when, as indicated above, no real control can be exercised over the rate at which serviced and zoned 
land will come to the market. 
DEVELOPMENT LAND VALUES AND SPECULATION 
Inevitably, scarce resources for infrastructure must be used in a cost efficient way and prioritised. As 
a result there may be a perceived shortage of development land. Once shortages are perceived, 
speculators will buy land to cash in on anticipated price rises. Moreover, having acquired land, a 
speculator has an incentive to maintain the shortage and keep values up by not developing the land 
until it suits their business interests. This may not be in accordance with the needs of the market or 
the timeframe of the development plan.  
This is an inevitable outcome of a market economy interacting with the planning system. In a market 
economy, nimble entrepreneurs will seek opportunities to make money where the system creates 
suitable conditions. This is not bad in itself but it can be a problem if the planning system facilitates 
and encourages it. It is clearly damaging if it results in very high land prices and a shortage of 
development land coming on the market. If the planning system creates fertile conditions for 
speculators to amass super profits from their activities, this should be taken as clear evidence of a 
defect.  
Plainly there is no sense in only zoning sufficient land to meet projected development needs if 
enough of it is not available to the market. The reality is that the planning system puts owners of 
development land in something of a monopoly position. As presently structured, however, it gives 
an economic and monetary incentive to developers to act against the public interest by timing their 
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disposal decisions to maximise the gain to them. This situation is not a flaw with market economics, 
it is the way the planning system is allowed to operate that creates the conditions to allow this.  
As has been noted above, before the ’63 Planning Act, property development took place with out 
planning regulation and the difference between the values of agricultural land and development 
land were not great. The zoning decision of the planning authority to concentrate development and 
confine it to particular lands is the mechanism that creates the primary escalation in development 
land values above those prevailing if the land could be put solely to agricultural use. Clearly the 
benefit of this should flow to the community and not just to the small number of people who 
happen to own the land that is zoned.  
What was not appreciated nor understood when the planning system was devised was the 
difference the planning process could create in relative land values if there were marginal shortages 
in the amount of serviced land or if this land did not come to the market for development. Neither 
was it appreciated that this would open the way for intense speculation in development land. This 
lack of appreciation led to flaws in the 63 Planning Act that remain today.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH WINDFALL PROFITS FROM HIGH LAND PRICES  
Since the introduction of the planning system in 1964 public interest in the problem of high 
development land values has waxed and waned with the booms and busts of the property market.  
In times of economic growth high development land values eventually emerge, hit the headlines and 
are seen as a problem. First they are perceived to drive up the price of property. Secondly the vast 
windfall profits, made from the sale such property, offend many who have an instinctive feeling that 
something must be wrong with a system that hands vast wealth to a few for so little economic 
effort. Also high land values cause problems for public authorities in acquiring land for the provision 
of infrastructure. Eventually there is a move to investigate the situation.  
In the past by the time the matter was moved to a point where policy options are considered the 
economic conditions that created the problem have abated and perhaps this is why the problem 
remains unresolved. It is interesting to note that there is now increasing interest in finding measures 
to deal with issues arising from high development land values just as the economy moves down a 
gear or two. Nonetheless there is a lot to be learned from reviewing past attempts to deal with 
issues surrounding the high price of development land  
THE KENNY REPORT  
When the problem of high land values and the windfall profits made from zoning became a problem 
following the introduction of the ’63 Planning Act a Committee on the Price of Building Land 
produced what is called the Kenny Report. In fact this committee had divided views about what 
should be done and majority and minority reports were produced.  
The majority report suggested that local authorities designate areas required for development for 
the next five years (the statutory period for development plans at the time) and buy the land, 
compulsorily if necessary, at existing use value (agricultural value). It would then be sold to the 
market at development value. Clearly if all landowners were to get was agricultural land values, the 
incentive to bring zoned land to the market would have been removed and the state would have had 
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to buy most of the land through compulsory purchase procedures which are necessarily 
cumbersome and time consuming.  
This would have created a monopoly on the supply of development land. Also, the amount of 
development land coming on the market would have been dependent on the financial resources of 
the authority and their efficiency. If they were not able to acquire all the land needed and only 
acquired some land leaving others to sell privately on the market at development value this would 
have created the conditions for endless legal challenges to the legislation. The minority of the 
committee felt that this procedure would have been cumbersome, unfair and open to constitutional 
challenge.  
Moreover, it probably would have led to some undesirable practices to incentivise those who owned 
development land to bring it to the market. Developers seeking land on which to build might have 
created vehicles to arrange partnerships with landowners or other methods to circumvent the 
measures adopted to give effect to the reports proposals.  
The majority proposals were in many ways a product of a time when, politically and philosophically, 
central planning by government and non-market solutions to economic and social problems were 
more acceptable. Nothing was done in any event and the problem faded with the recession in the 
mid 1970s which resulted in falling development land values.  
Implementing the Kenny Report proposals has now become shorthand for doing something about 
the shortage of development land on the market and capturing the windfall profits made from the 
sale of development land. They remain an attractive proposition for the political left and are often 
cited as something that could be done by government. However the criticisms remain valid. The 
administrative problems associated with this solution would still need to be addressed. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that a public sector monopoly of the supply of development land would be successful in 
meeting the needs of a dynamic and highly market orientated property industry. It is entirely likely 
that such a scheme would collapse if it were to be implemented. 
JOINT OIREACHTAS COMMITTEE ON BUILDING LAND 
The problem re-emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s and a joint committee of the Oireachtas 
investigated the issue. This committee concluded that the most appropriate approach to recouping 
the value from rezoning was through a combination of development charges and taxation. In a 
subsequent budget a rate of 60% (20% higher than the standard rate) was applied to profits from 
rezoning land through the capital gains tax code. The other part of the solution, development 
charges, could be applied in particular circumstances under the planning acts. 
As a result of the report measures were implemented which dealt to some degree with the problem 
of speculative profits on building land. It was not an entirely satisfactory solution but it did serve to 
ameliorate some of the worst excesses of speculation in land. 
But these measures did not address the problem of the connection between servicing and zoning 
particular lands and bringing those lands to the market. Nor did this solution provide the resources 
to local authorities to provide the infrastructure for development or a means of benefiting from the 
value they created by the provision of this infrastructure. 
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There, however, the matter stood until recently when two things changed. The capital gains tax code 
was changed and the planning bill published.  
THE SITUATION TODAY  
As a measure to encourage supply, the capital gains tax on the sale of residential development lands 
was reduced following the first Bacon Report. The Minister for Finance made it clear, however, that 
he intended to re-instate the higher rate in the future – otherwise a landowner could gain more by 
holding on to land and capturing any increase in value. 
Clearly this incentive depends upon the expectation that the minister will actually apply the higher 
rate of tax at some specified time in the future. But the argument that landowners need an incentive 
to bring land to the market will more than likely remain and will be adduced at any time it is 
suggested that the higher level of capital gains tax is proposed to be reintroduced. 
 In reality it seems unlikely to many given the present approach to taxation that the higher rate will 
be reinstated for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the incentive to bring land to the market early to 
avoid a higher rate of tax rather than waiting to capture future increases in value fails.  
THE EXPERIENCE IN THE UK  
Not surprisingly, given that the original planning legislation in Ireland, the ’63 Planning Act, was 
based on UK legislation, there are a lot of similarities both in the measures adopted but also in the 
problems arising from them.  
The problem of the effect on land values of establishing the role of planning in a welfare state had 
been the subject of much debate in the UK when the planning process was reformed there after 
WWII. As might be expected in a more urbanised society which had seen a vast amount of urban 
development in the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a great awareness of the effects of planning 
decisions on land values.  
By the end of WWII the question of capturing the increases in the value of some property holdings 
flowing from favourable planning decisions and compensating those who lost the right to develop or 
were otherwise adversely affected, had been the subject of political debate in the UK for well over a 
century. This was commonly referred to as the Compensation-Betterment problem. Attempts to 
deal with it had been made in the nineteenth century in England both by local authorities and by 
some railway companies with mixed success.  
In the UK also the introduction of a legislative planning process effectively removed development 
rights from all property owners and created a process where the right to develop any particular 
property would be granted by a planning authority following an application for permission to so do. 
This permission was granted following an assessment of the development proposal against criteria 
laid down in a development plan adopted for the area in which the property was located.  
The principal recommendation of the Uthwatt Committee, set up during WWII to consider the issues 
surrounding the proposed introduction of a new planning regime after the war, were that the 
development rights in all land outside built up areas should, on the payment of compensation, 
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become vested in the state and that there should be a prohibition against development of such land 
without the consent of the planning authority.  
What it was intended to compensate for was the loss in the value of land which prior to the 
introduction of the planning system could have been developed but after planning was not zoned for 
development and could only be used for agriculture. This recognised that the introduction of a 
planning system which zoned land for development and reserved other land for agriculture or as a 
green belt increased the value of some land and decreased the value of other land. The intention 
was to acquire land, zone some for development and sell it at a premium. The resulting profits were 
intended to provide the funds to compensate those who were not lucky enough to have their land 
zoned for development.  
What was called shifting land values was a consequence of introducing the planning system which 
provided for land zoning. The Uthwatt Report 1941 discussed in some detail the problem of shifting 
land values under such a planning code. It defined betterment as ‘an increase in the value of land 
resulting from the action of government (local and national) whether positive, an increase due to 
public works or improvements, or negative, an increase due to the restriction on the development or 
use of other land.’ 
It should be remembered that in the absence of planning all land would have had some 
development value but as this was spread over all land and not confined to that land zoned for 
development, land values would have been substantially less. Confining all development to 
particular zoned lands concentrated development value to those lands.  
Two main pieces of legislation, The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and the Land Commission 
Act 1967, were based on this report.  
Not surprisingly the UK Labour Party proposed the nationalisation of development values with the 
Conservative Party arguing against. The Town and Country Planning Act 1947, introduced a system 
of nationalising development values and the supply of land for development dried up because there 
was not sufficient incentive for landowners to free up land for development. Naturally on the return 
to government of the Conservative Party it was repealed in 1954. 
The UK Finance Act of 1965 brought in a system of capital gains taxation that captured some of the 
windfall profits made from development land but the matter still remained one of considerable 
political contention. A Land Commission Act was passed in 1967 but repealed in 1971. The UK 
Finance Act again tried to come to terms with the problem in 1974 and again in 1975 a Community 
Land Act was passed but again repealed shortly afterwards.  
It can be seen from the above that many proposals to deal with the issue failed because of 
insufficient political consensus or because the procedures involved proved to be unworkable or too 
complex. 
It can be said that in the end a pragmatic solution evolved using a combination of capital gains taxes, 
development levies or charges, negotiated planning gain and rigorous enforcement of the green belt 
policies. In short the UK experience indicates that the compensation betterment problem is a 
complex problem not amenable to easy solutions.  
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APPROACHES TO BE ADOPTED TO DEAL WITH HIGH DEVELOPMENT LAND PRICES  
Having considered the issue of the high price of development land and the problems surrounding 
high house and property prices, it can be seen that the issues involved are complex. It would appear 
from the history of attempts to deal with the question of capturing for the state the value created by 
the act of granting a planning permission on development land, and providing the necessary 
infrastructure, that the most effective solution is a combination of three elements. A capital gains 
tax on profits made from the sale of development land, negotiated planning gain and development 
levies.  
A combination of these measures could bring down the ambient value of development land and 
make the market for development land work more efficiently. These are dealt with more fully below.  
CAPITAL GAINS TAX  
An appropriate level of capital gains tax on profits made from the sale of development land should 
exist. Such a system existed until recently and could readily be reinstated. Reflecting the reality of 
windfall profits from development land, CGT was at 60% in the past, a rate of 20% above the 
standard rate of CGT. There would seem to be strong arguments on equity grounds, and on the 
grounds of economic efficiency, that a rate of CGT above that applied to other gains should be made 
in the case of development land. In particular, given the present CGT regime where inflation is not 
taken into account in calculating capital gains, this would provide a disincentive to hold on to 
development land for long periods of time. Moreover, such a high level of CGT would provide 
something of a disincentive to speculation.  
PLANNING GAIN  
Planning authorities should be given a clear statutory authority to negotiate with developers and get 
them to provide additional infrastructure facilities to accompany development. This could be done 
quite easily. Large developments should come automatically with a range of social and public 
amenities, e.g. playgrounds for children. Also, a specific contribution should be made by developers 
to the education authorities for the provision of additional schools and to the health authorities for 
the provision of the local accommodation needed by public health system.  
The justification for this is that property is sold on the implicit assumption by purchasers that these 
will be provided in the area and part of the value of a property is the capacity to access community 
amenities.  
DEVELOPMENT LEVIES  
At present these exist but the schemes devised to apply them are based on the cost to the local 
authority of providing the infrastructure. This is then apportioned to development land in 
accordance with a specified formula. This measure is flawed in concept and only goes part of the 
way to recouping the value created by infrastructure provision. Local authorities should be 
empowered to devise a scheme for the application of levies in accordance with the value added to 
development land which is the subject of a planning permission and not on the basis of the cost to 
them of such provision as is provided for in the legislation.  
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The Planning Act of 2000 sets out a system of levying development contributions and specifies that 
these should have regard to the cost of provision of the services. The Act specifically excludes 
benefits accruing from existing services, which is significant.  
This goes to the heart of the problems with the planning code in Ireland including the high price of 
development land. The formula used in the Act is inadequate to recoup value created by the actions 
of a planning authority. It also does nothing to encourage the owners of zoned land to bring it to the 
market speedily.  
This can be best illustrated by considering a hypothetical situation where land on the outskirts of 
Dublin cannot be developed because of a lack of services which would only be provided by a public 
authority. The market value of this land would reflect the lack of supporting infrastructure and the 
consequent inability to develop. Clearly, the value would be substantially below that which would 
apply if planning permission had been granted and the services provided.  
The Planning Act allows planning authorities to recoup the part of the cost of providing 
infrastructure and services but not the increase in value conferred on the owner by connecting to 
these and the decision to grant planning permission. 
It would be more equitable if the basis for estimating the contribution from developers was based 
on the value created by the activities of the local authority and not on the cost to them of these. To 
do this they should be able to charge to the developer the addition to the value of the land arising 
from the provision of the infrastructure, the services and by the grant of planning permission.  
This would be the difference between the value before the services were provided and permission 
granted and the value afterwards. The ‘before’ figure would reflect a combination of hope value and 
existing use value. The ‘after’ figure would be the market value with the benefit of the services and 
the planning permission reflecting the certainty that development could proceed immediately. The 
difference between these figures should be the development levy.  
To enable a planning authority to encourage landowners to bring land to the market it should have 
the power to rebate the development charge in the event of the landowner developing the lands 
within a specified time which could be specified in the development plan. This measure would deal 
with one of the main deficiencies of the existing arrangements under which planners have no 
mechanism for influencing the rate at which development land comes on the market or is 
developed.  
This approach would change the role of a planning authority from being a regulator and provider of 
services and infrastructure, to one of development enabler. Under this arrangement the value 
created by the actions of the planning authority is shared between both developers and the 
community in proportion to their contribution to creating the development value. 
In passing it is important to point out that any schemes for charging development levies should be 
devised in a form that creates certainty in the minds of prospective developers as to the nature of 
the obligations they may have to meet in the event of them getting a planning permission.  
It would also be important that the planning function within local authorities employ professionals 
equipped with the financial and economic expertise needed to evaluate development proposals and 
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negotiate with developers. These professionals should be qualified in finance and/or property 
economics.  
Using a combination of capital gains tax, development levies or charges and negotiated planning 
gain would have three benefits. First, it would substantially remove the incentive to speculate in 
development land. Second, it would help to ensure orderly development in accordance with plans 
devised by planning authorities by giving them some control over the rate at which the zoned lands 
will come to the market. Third, by being able to capture the increase in the value of zoned lands it 
should help to provide planning authorities with the means to service a sufficient quantity of 
development land to ensure that the market for development land works more efficiently and make 
the planning system self-financing. Such an approach would reduce the price of development land 
and contribute to the solution of the housing crises.  
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
• There is a need for greater research into, and understanding of, spatial economics at all levels in 
the planning process. 
• Government policy in the area of planning and the built environment should be more closely 
integrated with tax and other policies to ensure a more joined up approach to providing the physical 
development which comes with economic growth. 
• There is a need for increased transparency in property and urban land markets. This could be 
achieved by: 
i) publishing transaction prices. 
ii) reducing transaction costs by codifying the legal basis for property ownership and 
simplifying conveyencing.  
iii) writing all documents associated with landed property in plain English  
• The mechanisms for dealing with development land in the tax code and the planning acts should 
be reformed: 
i) by taxing at an appropriate level the windfall profits made from the disposal of such land  
ii) by facilitating local authorities negotiating with developers to attain planning gains as part 
of permissions to develop 
iii)  by changing the Planning Act to allow Local Authorities to capture the value they create by 
providing infrastructure and services and by regulating development through plans. 
